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Nominal and Inflation-Linked Government Bonds: An assessment of arbitrage 
opportunities in UK Gilt Market 
 
 
 
Abstract: This study is an assessment of the existence of deviations of the Law of One 
Price in the UK sovereign debt market. UK government issues two types of debt 
instruments: nominal gilts and inflation-linked (IL) gilts. Constructing a synthetic bond 
comprising the IL bonds and also inflation-swaps and gilt strips I was able to build a 
portfolio that pays to investor exactly the same cash-flow as nominal gilts, with the 
same maturity. I found that the weighted-average mispricing throughout the period of 
2006-11 is only £0,155 per £100 notional. Though, if I restrain my analysis to the 
2008-09 crisis period, this amount raises to £4,5 per £100 invested. The 
weighted-average mispricing can reach values of £21 per £100 notional or, if measured 
in yield terms, 235 basis points. I have also found evidence that available liquidity on 
the market and increases on index-linked gilts supply do play a significant role on 
monthly changes of mispricing in the UK market. I concluded that, although the global 
mispricing is not significant on UK gilt market, every pair of bonds in the sample 
presented huge and significant arbitrage opportunities in downturn periods. 
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1. Introduction 
The basics of the Law of One price defend that if two instruments pay an investor 
the same, they should be equally priced. On the sovereign debt market the theory should 
also hold. As the present study suggests, that doesn’t happen in the UK gilt market. It 
was found that index-linked gilts, on average, are undervalued in relation to the nominal 
gilts. The mispricing
1
 is not always constant through time, often changing its sign. Still, 
at the crisis period it reaches a huge positive magnitude. During that period, the 
mispricing of a single index-linked gilt in relation to its nominal counterpart can reach 
values above £28 per £100 notional. On average, the index-linked gilts reach a 
mispricing maximum of 21% of the notional invested. 
The methodology used on the present study is mainly based on two instruments 
issued by the governments on their sovereign debt balances: nominal and 
inflation-linked government bonds
2
 (ILB). An investor who buys an inflation-linked 
bond can, by entering in an inflation swap agreement, turn his variable cash-flows into 
fixed ones. Additionally, through the usage of strips, the investor is able to build a 
synthetic bond that pays exactly equal cash-flows to the ones paid by nominal bonds 
with same maturity. The final price of both instruments will allow an assessment of 
whether or not there is mispricing (and with which sign). 
Based mainly on Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012), the present study is 
of utmost importance since it aims at providing an insight on the mispricing in other 
markets than in the American one. By doing so, I try to test if the American bond prices 
relationship holds in markets outside America (namely in the UK) or if the TIPS 
mispricing is an isolated case when studying ILBs. It also goes in line with the literature 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this study, the term mispricing will stand for an undervaluation of the IL bonds in relation to 
the nominal counterparts. A negative mispricing stands for the opposite relationship.   
2
 The latest would be referred throughout this paper as ILB 
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by trying to study, in a simplistic way, what might be the factors causing mispricing in 
UK market and compare them with the results for the American case.  
In order to perform the aforementioned strategy, data for UK gilt market was taken 
from January 2006 until the end of 2011. Although the average mispricing is positive, 
presenting a value of £0,155 per £100 invested (this value goes up on the 2008-09 
period for 4,5% of the notional) or 6,84 basis points, two of the five pairs selected had a 
negative mispricing. The first does not include the crisis years, a period that turned out 
to be the most relevant factor on the analysis of the remaining pairs. The second one, 
though, was also the one presenting the higher mispricing occurrence. All of the pairs 
considered presented negative mispricing clustering periods throughout the sample. 
Since all bond pairs presented great mispricing levels on the crisis period, a further 
analysis leaded to a comparison between the changes on mispricing with the returns of 
the stock market. In fact, as it was predictable, the higher levels of mispricing were 
verified on periods of weaker performance of the market.  
Such times are characterized by lower investing capacity of the investors. As such, 
the study tried to test if the mispricing levels are caused either by shortages of capital 
available or by changes on bonds supply. Both factors turned out to be relevant, being 
the returns on the stock market, the investing capacity of global hedge funds and the 
supply of IL gilts significant variables for the monthly change of mispricing. The results 
are aligned with previous similar studies for the American market. Still, relation 
between mispricing and bonds supply is quite different. On the gilt market, supply of 
nominal instruments is not significant (in contrary with what happens in the American 
market) and issuing ILBs creates the opposite effect on mispricing of the American 
TIPS supply.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 aims at providing a brief 
literature review of the related studies. Besides giving a brief description of the main 
differences between nominal and ILBs, section 3 provides a description of UK markets 
for each of the fixed-income instruments. Section 4 describes the arbitrage strategy built 
in order to perform the study as well as the data used. Section 5 scrutinises the size of 
mispricing as well as further issues on this matter. Concluding remarks are present on 
section 6.  
2. Literature Review 
This study is consequent to some recent literature on the Asset Pricing Puzzle 
resulting from the mispricing between the two aforementioned types of Government 
debt instruments. Namely Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012) studied the 
relationship between TIPS and Treasury bonds and concluded that there was, 
consistently, a great mispricing between the two types of securities. Their evidence 
suggests that the nominal markets are usually overpriced when comparing with the 
TIPS market.  
Other important studies on this subject include an even more recent study by 
Fleckenstein (2012), who performs an analysis for several other countries. The 
evidence on G7 countries’ markets points to the same conclusions previously mentioned 
for US data and so, challenging the Asset Pricing Theory and the Law of one Price.  
Both studies are not focused solely on measuring the mispricing on the bonds 
market. The authors go further in the matter, analysing which factors can be on the roots 
and on the persistence of the mispricing as well as its financial and economic 
implications. Yet, they focus their studies mostly on the scope of the Slow-moving 
Capital theory. The authors go in line with other studies as Mitchell, Pedersen and 
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Todd Pulvino (2007) and state that arbitrage opportunities may arise and persist in time 
due to some frictions, as liquidity shortages. Although basing the present study on these 
papers, I have tried to hold off my analysis from the Slow-moving Capital theory, as 
further considerations would have to be made on that matter. 
3. UK fixed-income Markets 
This section aims at providing some insights about the fixed-income instruments 
and respective markets relevant for the building of the proposed arbitrage strategy. A 
summary of each instrument features can be found on Appendix A, table 1. 
The first three instruments are traded on the UK Gilt Market, responsibility of the 
UK Debt Management Office (DMO). The main responsibility of this entity is the 
issuance of the sovereign debt instruments, as conventional gilts and index-linked gilts 
(at the end of March 2012, the latest accounted for around 22,8% of the total gilt 
portfolio
3
).  
UK Conventional Gilts 
Nominal Gilts constitute the largest part of UK Government bonds portfolio. This 
instrument defines an obligation between the Government and the debt-holder: the 
former receives the bond price, whilst the second receives several fixed interest 
payments with a specific frequency within a year
4
. At maturity, the debt holder receives 
the last coupon and also the face value of the instrument. 
UK Index-Linked Gilts 
Nowadays, inflation-linked government bonds have been gaining major importance 
in Europe, as their outstanding volume has been increasing since the beginning of the 
last decade. This trend is observable both in Euro Area countries (with relatively recent 
                                                          
3
 DMO - UK Government Securities: a Guide to ‘Gilts’ – Tenth Edition 2012  
4
 Both the fixed coupon rate and the frequency of payments are defined at the issuance date. 
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issuances from the French, Italian and German governments), which increased ten times 
the outstanding volume since 2002
5
, and also in non-Euro Area countries as UK and 
Sweden. In Appendix A, figure 1, one might find a ranking of the main issuers of 
inflation-linked debt in the World as well as their respective issued notional amount. 
Focusing on the UK’s case, British Government started to issue ILBs in 1981, 
being one of the first issuers of such kind of debt instruments between developed 
countries. The government acted in response to a great decrease in real value of nominal 
debt caused by the rising inflation at the 70ies. In such way, debt was endowed with an 
anti-inflationary measure that could protect its value. Moreover, those instruments 
would overcome the reducing demand for sovereign instruments on inflationary periods.  
Inflation-linked gilts are also characterized by a coupon rate. However, each 
payment – which is made twice a year in all the existent UK government ILBs – is 
adjusted for inflation. This is, coupons and the principal payment are adjusted for the 
RPI index (General Index of Retail Prices), in order to account for the change in 
inflation since the issuance of the bond. This adjustment is made by an indexation factor 
which, further, it will be called It. It is calculated by doing the ratio between reference 
RPI at payment date and the reference RPI at issuing date. 
DMO’s portfolio is constituted by two different index-linked gilts. They differ on 
the price calculation, in result of different indexation lags. The reference RPI to be used 
in each indexation factor depends on the lagging of these bonds. 
Bonds issued prior to 2005 have an 8-month lag, while all bonds issued after that 
date have a 3-month lag
6
. Besides the difference on the computation of the indexation 
factor, they also differ on the price calculation and quotation. The 8-month lag bonds 
                                                          
5
 Danmarks Nationalbank (2011) 
6
 Which means that reference RPI used on indexation factor for a specific date is the 8-month and 3-
month prior quoted value 
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are quoted on nominal terms, this is, their price is adjusted for the inflation verified 
since the issue of the bond. This price is obtained by multiplying the “real price”
7
 by the 
indexation ratio. These bonds prices are often quoted above £200 since the RPI had 
risen by more than 200% since 1983 (when the government started issuing 
inflation-linked bonds)
8
. The bonds using a lagging mechanism of 3-months (also called 
Canadian Style), are quoted in real terms (as it happens with the nominal gilts). There 
are also differences to take into account on the cash-flow and accrued interest 
calculation
9
. 
In contrary with what happens with US TIPS, inflation-linked gilts do not have a 
deflation floor. This means that if there is a deflationary effect from the issuance to the 
maturity, the principal value can go below the settled par value.  
UK Gilt Strips 
The process of stripping a bond consists in separating each cash-flow paid by the 
gilt into individual zero-coupon bonds. This means that each Strip will only pay to its 
holder one cash-flow on its maturity. In example, a one year maturity bond paying a 
semi-annual coupon of 2% would be strippable into 3 Strips: two paying 1 on each 
semester, and other one paying 100 on the maturity. In UK the process of stripping 
issued bonds was started in 1997, with the introduction of an official Strip facility. 
Inflation Swaps 
The most common inflation swaps are the zero-coupon (ZC) inflation swaps. This 
kind of securities is considered to be the standard inflation derivative
10
. A ZC inflation 
swap is an agreement between two parties: a buyer and a seller. They are used as 
                                                          
7
 The term “real price” means that the price is quoted for 100 units of principal. It works as a percentage 
of the principal. 
8
 Brynjolfsson (2002) 
9
 Price, cash-flow and accrued interest calculations for both type of bonds are explained on DMO’s 
handbook Formulae for Calculating Gilt Prices from Yields 
10
Kerkhof (2005) 
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protection instruments against inflation risk. This kind of security only pays one 
cash-flow at its maturity date. Whilst the buyer pays to the seller a fixed rate, s, this one 
pays inflation indexed cash-flows (in UK case, the value of the RPI from the issuance to 
the maturity date – again It) to the former. The fixed rate, s, reflects the inflation 
expectations during the lifetime of the agreement. The cash-flow transaction is depicted 
on figure 2. 
 
 
The quotation of the ZC inflation swaps is made through the stated fixed rate. There 
are quotations ranging the 1-year to 50-years maturity. As the inflation-linked bonds, 
these rates do also have a lagging mechanism. The UK’s inflation swaps have a 2 
months lag (and so they report to the two-months prior RPI). This may play an 
important role on defining the arbitrage strategy as it will be further explained on the 
next section. 
4. How to measure the Mispricing? 
Strategy 
Measuring a hypothetical mispricing between inflation-linked and nominal bonds, 
implies that an arbitrage strategy is built
11
. An investor pursuing this kind of strategy 
starts by taking a position on a nominal bond. This instrument pays in a semi-annual 
frequency a coupon c (considering a par value of 100). 
Similarly, a position on an ILB should be made. Such investment should be made 
on an ILB maturing on the same date as the nominal bond, in order to compare 
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 Both  strategy  and  methodology  followed  the steps taken  by  Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012) 
Buyer Seller 
notional(1+s)
t 
notional(It) 
Net Cash Flow to the Seller: 
 notional(1+s)
t 
- notional(It) 
Figure 2: Zero-Coupon Inflation Swap Mechanics 
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cash-flows. The former pays a semi-annual coupon b. As explained in the previous 
section, each coupon payment will be adjusted for inflation by a factor It, and so, the 
cash-flow of each semester before maturity will be bIt (at maturity, (100+b)It). 
 In order to turn each variable cash-flow into a fixed one, the investor has to enter in 
ZC Inflation Swap agreements – paying a fixed inflation swap rate of s. The maturity of 
each agreement should match the ones of the ILB coupon payments as well as the 
notional value should equal the fixed component of the ILB’s coupon, b. In a particular 
date, t, the cash-flow provided by the swap agreement will be b(1+s)
t
 – bIt. By taking 
this position on the swaps for each of the ILB payments, all the cash-flows to the 
investor will be non-variable
12
. 
Finally, to eliminate the differential between the cash-flows available of the two 
instruments, the investor will have to take a small position on the Strips market. That 
position is equal to the difference between each nominal and inflation-linked cash-flow. 
As it can be seen on table 2, and following the steps described above, at a particular 
date t (that can be generalized for all the payments of the securities), the final 
cash-flows present a perfect match. 
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 The sum of ILB cash flows and Inflation swaps considering a general case, date t, will be: bIt 
+b(1+s)
t
 – bIt = b(1+s)
t
 
 Instrument Cash Flow 
2.1 Nominal Bond c 
   
2.2 Inflation Indexed Bond bIt 
2.3 Inflation Swap b(1+s)
t  
– bIt 
2.4 (2.2+2.3) ∑ bIt +b(1+s)
t
 – bIt = b(1+s)
t
 
2.5 (2.1-2.4) Strip c - b(1+s)
t
 
2.4+2.5 ∑ b(1+s)
t
 + c - b(1+s)
t
 = c 
Table 2: The strategy cash-flows at year t 
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The mispricing, then, can be measured by comparing the nominal bond price with 
the price of all positions taken in the synthetic bond. In case of non-violation of the Law 
of One Price equation 1 must hold. 
(1) Gilt Price = IL Gilt Price + ( ∑ Strips Cash-Flowsi ) Price of Stripi 
13
 
Data and Methodology 
In order to perform the aforementioned strategy, I have gathered daily prices for 
UK conventional, index-linked gilts and Strips from January 3
rd
, 2006 to December 30
th
, 
2011 (all the prices are adjusted for accrued interest). For the inflation swaps, daily data 
was also taken but from July 1
st
, 2005 to the end of 2011. Although the data for all 
securities is available on the Bloomberg terminal, Strips prices were taken from DMO’s 
website.  
The first step was to select all the possible matching pairs of bonds. The securities’ 
maturity gap must be the lower possible. There are any pairs with equal maturities so, 
defining a two-month criterion for maturity differences, five pairs of bonds were 
selected. Their main features are summarised on table 3. 
  Table 3: Selected pairs of conventional and index-linked bonds 
Gilt Coupon Index-Linked Coupon Indexation Lag Maturity Difference 
07-09-2016 4% 26-07-2016 2,5% 8-month 41 
07-03-2020 4,75% 16-04-2020 2,5% 8-month 39 
07-12-2027 4,25% 22-11-2027 1,25% 3-month 15 
07-12-2042 4,5% 22-11-2042 0,625% 3-month 15 
07-12-2055 4,25% 22-11-2055 1,25% 3-month 15 
In order to start building the strategy, monthly fixed rates for the Inflation Swaps 
were needed. From Bloomberg I had access to daily closing prices of inflation swaps 
with maturities of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40 and 50 years.   
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 Inflation swaps do not have a settlement price as previously explained. 
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The monthly fixed rates can be obtained from the set of annual rates using an 
interpolation method. In order to get a smooth curve the method chosen was the cubic 
interpolation. The higher the interpolation degree is, the smoother the curve
14
. However, 
having monthly rates, seasonality on inflation should be taken off the series.  
Therefore, following the literature
15
, in order to estimate seasonality effects, a 
dummy variable model should be built. I have taken monthly data for the RPI index 
since January 1980 until December 2011. Given those numbers, logarithms of 
moving-base index numbers were calculated in order to capture the changes in the RPI. 
The last step was to use an Ordinary Least Squares regression of the logs on monthly 
dummies, mi (m1=January, m2 = February, (…), m12=December ).  
(2) log(RPIt/RPIt-1) = ∑        
  
 , where 
(3)    
            
                    
 
A first normalization was calculated in order to get each month corrected seasonal 
effect. After calculating the regression coefficients, one should subtract the average of 
all the coefficients to each one of them
16
.  
(4)   
      ̅ 
Then, the seasonal adjustment factors, mi, are obtained by scaling the corrected 
coefficients, turning the product of all factors equal to 1. The rationale here is that this 
will guarantee that full year swaps are not influenced by seasonal patterns. 
In order to take the seasonal effects from the interpolated rates, one should find the 
forward rates, f, corresponding to each estimated month. Equation 5 describes the 
formula used for the computation. 
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 Wanningen (2007) 
15
 Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012) 
16
 Belgrade (2004) found evidence that inflation seasonality follows an additive model. 
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(5) fa-b =  
       
   
        17 
The monthly inflation swap rates adjusted for seasonality are obtained by 
multiplying all the forward rates for the seasonal adjustment factors and converting 
them again into spot rates.  
After calculating the monthly inflation swap rates, I was able to start building the 
strategy explained on the previous subsection. However some adjustments should be 
made. The first has to do with the fact that 8-months index-linked gilts are quoted in 
nominal terms. In order to compute the mispricing, and because all the other prices are 
on real terms, the nominal price should be divided by the respective indexation ratio in 
order to get the real price.  
(6) Nominal Price = Real Price   
                                
                           
    18  
The second adjustment is made when entering on inflation swap agreements. Here 
and as aforementioned, the differences on the lagging should be taken into account. As 
the UK’s inflation swaps have a two-month lag, the rate used on a specific date of the 
strategy must not be the one quoted on that day. For 8-months and 3-months 
index-linked gilts, the rate to apply on the strategy should be the one quoted exactly on 
the preceding sixth and first month respectively. This step is crucial in order to 
overcome the differential on the lagging between the two instruments. 
Finally, cash-flows should be adjusted for the maturity mismatch. The inflation 
indexed synthetic bond should equal the maturity of both conventional gilts and strips. 
For that purpose, I have calculated the yield to maturity of the synthetic bond 
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 Cassino and Pepper (2011) state that that formula can be applied when calculating forward rates for 
zero-cupon inflation swaps. 
18
 The reference RPI for each date is the eighth-month prior RPI 
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comprising ILB and inflation swap agreements’ positions. This allowed me to calculate 
the price of a new synthetic bond exactly matching the nominal gilt maturity
19
. The 
remainder of the strategy is simply follow the steps described on the previous 
subsection 
5. Is there any arbitrage opportunity on Gilts Market? 
The main results from applying the arbitrage strategy on the Gilt market can be 
observable on Figure 3. The left-hand side graph depicts the magnitude of the 
mispricing in British Pounds. Each bar is identified by the inflation-linked bond of the 
pair. Besides the amplitude of the mispricing, observable by the range between the 
minimum and the maximum mispricing per £100, the average mispricing is plotted with 
the black marker. The right hand-side also shows the mispricing but measured as the 
difference on the yield to maturity of the gilt and the synthetic bond (in basis points). 
On Appendix B, table 4 summarizes the statistics for the five pairs, including the 
number of observations and also the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.  
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 The price computation took into account the accrued interest calculation diferences for the two types of 
IL Bonds 
Figure 3 - Mispricing in British Pounds by £100 notional (left-hand side) and in Basis Points (right-hand side) – 
Minimum, maximum and average of mispricing 
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The results described on figure 3 and on table 4, appendix B, are not completely 
clear in what concerns the existence of mispricing in the UK sovereign debt market. 
Three of the five pairs do show an average mispricing of the index-linked securities. 
The other two have, on average, a negative mispricing. Yet, all the pairs reached a 
significant mispricing value at some point of the sample period
20
. The longer maturity 
pair, although presenting a negative mispricing average of £1,58 per £100 notional, 
present the higher maximum value between all pairs included (28% of notional).  
The results can be compared with the ones reached by Fleckenstein, Longstaff 
and Lustig (2012) for the United States
21
. By doing so, one might conclude that 
evidence on US markets for mispricing is much more conclusive than in the UK market. 
In all 29 pairs included on their study, the authors report a positive mispricing of the 
inflation-indexed bonds in relation to the nominal ones. Moreover, only ten do present 
cases of overpricing of the Treasury nominal bonds over all sample period. On average, 
the mispricing on US market is constantly positive, fact that does not occur in any of the 
UK pairs that present times of negative mispricing clustering, as it can be seen on 
Appendix C, figure 4. 
Comparing also the five pairs included in the sample, one might not conclude that 
the mispricing level varies either with maturity or with the lagging mechanism. Even 
though longer maturities and 3-month index-linked gilts are the ones presenting lower 
mispricing levels, the 2055 maturity pair, as aforementioned, is the one that presents a 
higher mispricing occurrence. 
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 Issues on this matter will be discussed in detail further in this study 
21
 The differences on the sample period of the study mentioned are not relevant for this comparison 
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Following the literature
22
, in order to measure the occurrence or not of mispricing 
in the gilt market, for each trading day, I have computed a weighted average of all the 
pairs that were available on that date. The daily mispricing is weighted by each 
inflation-linked gilt notional amount (in total) issued. The average mispricing of all 
securities is only £0,155 per £100 notional. However, analysing the respective statistics, 
the mispricing reaches a level of around £21 per £100 notional (at the end of 2008), 
which is a huge value when comparing with the maximum mispricing verified on US 
and computed on the study previously mentioned (9,6% of the notional).  
Moreover, a deeper analysis throughout the sample leads to the conclusion that the 
2008-2009 crisis had a great impact on the gilt market mispricing. The mispricing 
values were plotted on the graphs presented in appendix C, figure 4. The ten graphs on 
the top depict the mispricing in all five bond pairs (in British pounds and in basis 
points), while the two in the bottom shows the weighted average mispricing throughout 
the sample period. 
As suggested on all graphs, in the period of the crisis, after September 2008 and 
until middle of 2009, the mispricing magnitude is huge. Comparing with the remaining 
sample period, where the amplitude of mispricing is very unstable – varying from 
periods with negative mispricing to others with a positive one -, the behaviour of the 
series in that period stands out. In fact, restraining the sample period to the period from 
September 2008 until December 2009, the weighted-average mispricing jumps to over 
£4,5 per  £100 notional. 
The (non)existence of a deflation floor for the index-linked bonds does play a role 
on the mispricing. In case of inflation-linked gilts, as already mentioned, they do not 
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  Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012) 
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have a deflation floor. In other words, at the maturity, if a deflation is verified the 
principal value of the bond is adjusted downwards. If IL gilts were endowed of such 
feature, the mispricing amplitude would be smaller. As a remark, transaction costs even 
though not considered in this study, would not have a great impact on gilts mispricing 
(mainly in the crisis period)
23
. 
The observable impact of downturns on mispricing turns out to be one plausible 
explanation for the lower values of mispricing verified on the pair maturing on 2042. 
The index-linked gilt was only issued on July 2009 and so the most relevant period for 
the other pairs’ mispricing had to be excluded from the analysis. 
So, it is now interesting to investigate how the mispricing behaved with the stock 
market returns. In order to do so, changes on monthly mispricing measured in basis 
points were calculated for the weighted-average mispricing series. On Appendix D, 
figure 5, those fluctuations were plotted against the returns on the London Stock 
Exchange Index (FTSE 100). 
Although not completely clear, the graph shows a negative relation between the two 
variables, confirmed by a correlation coefficient of -0,23. Such relationship is much 
more obvious on the crisis period then in other periods in which both variables move 
alongside with each other. It is so plausible to argue, that such relation can appear due to 
other factors than the performance of the stock market itself.  
Further issues on Gilt Market Mispricing 
 Following the literature, some factors to analyse the mispricing in the Gilt market 
were considered. Kilponen, Laakkonen and Vilmunen (2012), study the impact of 
Central Bank policies on the sovereign debt yields. In order to do so, the authors 
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 an estimation of such costs was performed by Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012) for US 
markets 
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considered some variables that might influence bond yields. Some of those factors were 
considered also as potential drivers for the mispricing on the US markets by 
Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig (2012). 
In order to complement the previous analysis of the influence of stock markets 
performance
24
 on mispricing in the Gilt market, a market risk perception measure was 
considered. The referred authors include on their sample a global uncertainty feeling, 
which is often measured by the implied volatility index for S&P500 (VIX). Furthermore, 
as argued by Nagel (2011) and Fleckenstein (2012), implied volatility is also a liquidity 
provision proxy. Periods of downturns are also periods when risk perception is higher 
and liquidity is restrained. This might influence the occurrence of mispricing.    
On Appendix D, it is plotted on figure 6 the monthly variation in basis points of 
the weighted-average mispricing against monthly data for VIX. Additionally, as values 
of VIX of 20% might indicate less worrying times on the market, while an index over 
30% signals high uncertainty
25
, a green and a red dotted line were plotted on the graph 
for those values respectively. As it might be expectable, the mispricing variation peaks 
coincide with the times when implied volatility is higher. Periods of high perception of 
risk (observable by the occurrences above the plotted lines) are the ones where the 
series denote a more similar behaviour.  Indeed, the global market perception of risk, 
and the mispricing on Gilt markets, present a correlation of 0,28. The evidence seems to 
confirm that high turbulence times have impact on the mispricing.   
In order to conclude this analysis a regression was estimated in order to try to test 
which factors are responsible for the mispricing. This regression was based on the 
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25 Wei (2012) 
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literature referred above and sticks to two main drivers for mispricing: the liquidity 
available for investors and the supply of bonds.  
Complementarily, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) discuss market liquidity in 
the scope of its co-movement with the market and its relation with volatility. As such, 
the two already analysed variables, stock returns and the returns on the VIX index, were 
considered as measures of liquidity. Basing on Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig 
(2012), the authors also include on their model the Global Hedge Fund Index as a proxy 
for the liquidity available for investors, globally. As the authors argue, the investing 
capacity of hedge funds does seem to influence asset pricing. This index is available on 
the Bloomberg terminal with the ticker HFRXGL, and the monthly return of the index 
was considered as explanatory variable. 
The supply factor was considered following the same literature. The authors 
concluded that for the US market, both supply of treasury and TIPS influence 
negatively the mispricing. Thus it is interesting to test whether or not such relationship 
verifies on the UK market. For this purpose, month-to-month changes on supply of 
either nominal or index-linked bonds were considered. Both series were built based on 
issue data taken from the DMO’s website. 
The dependent variable considered was the monthly change on basis points 
mispricing (the weighted-average series for all sample pairs). The aforementioned 
variables are identified, respectively, by the following names: FTSE; VIX; HF; 
Supply_nominal and Supply_IL. The first three variables are in percentage, whilst the 
latest two are on million £. The model considered is described by equation 7. 
(7) Mispricing(chg) = c +                                                  
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 The output of the regression is presented on table 5, appendix D and it allows 
us to take some interesting conclusions. The first factor considered, available liquidity, 
do present significant results. Both performance of the stock market and the variation on 
the hedge-funds capital are statistically significant for a 99% confidence level. A 
negative coefficient on both variables was achieved. In what concerns the performance 
of the market, this result is aligned with the previous analysis. A decrease on stock 
returns leads to an augmenting of the mispricing. The evidence that in periods of 
troubled waters the arbitrage opportunities on the gilt market arise is so confirmed. A 
shortening of hedge funds investing capacity should also cause an increasing 
mispricing. Such statement is confirmed by the negative sign of the regressed variable. 
The returns of implied volatility index, though, are not significant for any reasonable 
confidence level.  
The results for bonds supply are interesting, since they deviate from the ones 
presented for the US case, studied on the papers previously referred. On the UK market 
the supply of nominal bonds doesn’t seem to be significant. Such variable would only 
be significant for confidence levels of around 85% (before the usual corrections for 
heteroskedasticity, the variable was significant). Yet, it presents a negative sign which 
comes in hand with the results presented by the authors for the US case. On contrary, 
the supply of inflation-linked gilts is significant for a 2,5% level. Though, its sign is the 
opposite of the US similar variable. The model provides evidence that an increase of the 
amount of ILB available has a positive impact on mispricing and so, the composition of 
the Government debt structure influences the mispricing. An increase of the amount of 
IL gilts issued widens the mispricing, which means that it drives down their prices in 
relation with the nominal gilts.  
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The model, having global significance, confirms that both supply of bonds and 
liquidity available on the market do influence the mispricing on the market. Such results 
are, in general, aligned with the three studies mentioned on this section of the study.  
6. Conclusion 
This study provides an assessment to arbitrage opportunities in the UK sovereign 
debt market. The theory predicts that if two assets generate the same cash-flows to an 
investor, they should be equally priced. However, in various markets this principle is 
not verified and, as proven, the Gilt Market is one of them. The present work project 
estimates that, on average, the inflation-linked bonds are undervalued by a value of 
£0,155 per 100£ notional in relation to their nominal counterparts.  
Although the presented value is not as high as the one reached by related literature 
for the US case, one should not rely solely on this value. The magnitude of mispricing 
on the gilt market is much more significant in the 2008-09 crisis. Indeed, the weighted 
average mispricing on those years was £4,5 per £100 notional and had as maximum 
mispricing a value of 21% of the notional. These occurrences are very significant and 
above the ones estimated for the US. Still, it is shown that, on the UK, mispricing often 
changes the sign of its values. Negative mispricing is, generally, clustered on time. 
Finally, these findings lead the mispricing analysis to the scope of market 
performance. As expected, in times of high turbulence of the markets the mispricing 
increases. Also, it is on those times that there is a shortening of liquidity provision for 
investors. As such, evidence was found that this factor do play a role on the changes of 
mispricing. The returns on the market and the investing capacity of global hedge funds 
have a significant influence on the mispricing. Additionally, the increase on the supply 
of index-linked gilts also impacts positively the mispricing.  
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 Appendix A 
 
 
Instrument 
Indexation 
Lag 
Index Issuer Quotation 
Other 
features 
Gilts na na DMO Real Clean Price - 
IL Gilts 
3 months RPI DMO Real Clean Price 
No deflation 
floor 
8 months RPI DMO 
Nominal Clean 
Price 
No deflation 
floor 
Strips na na 
DMO 
(official 
Strip 
facility) 
Real Clean Price 
Coupon Strips 
and Principal 
Strips 
Inflation 
Swaps 
2 months 
RPI 
na 
Annualized rate 
(fixed leg of the 
agreement) 
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Figure 1 - Main Issuers of Index-Linked Government Bonds in the World (ranked) and 
Amount Issued (Billion $) 
Source: UK Standard Life Investments and Bloomberg (values for January 2013) 
 
Table 1 – Summarized features of the britisih fixed-income instruments considered 
 
na – not applicable 
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Appendix B 
Table 4 – Mispricing summarized statistics: Considered pairs and respective observations. The middle panel summarizes the main 
statistics (average, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, maximum and minimum) in terms of Great Britain Pounds. The right panel 
provides the same statistics, now for the mispricing measured in basis points. 
 
 
  
 
 
Pair Gilt Index-Linked 
Gilt 
Trading 
Days 
GBP YTM 
Avrg Std. Dev. CV Max Min Avrg Std. Dev. CV Max Min 
1 07-09-2016 26-07-2016 1461 1,64 5,68 3,46 24,36 -8,26 28,79 92,25 3,20 412,68 -124,03 
2 07-03-2020 16-04-2020 1564 0,98 6,46 6,60 26,43 -11,70 13,55 76,55 5,65 321,33 -128,65 
3 07-12-2027 22-11-2027 1324 0,77 3,90 5,06 16,51 -7,64 6,40 32,01 5,00 133,70 -61,96 
4 07-12-2042 22-11-2042 637 -3,10 3,66 1,18 8,15 -12,98 -16,87 19,43 1,15 39,47 -67,14 
5 07-12-2055 22-11-2055 1507 -1,58 6,67 4,21 28,19 -21,63 -7,19 32,53 4,52 159,79 -101,82 
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Appendix C 
Figure 4 – Pairs and Weighted Average Mispricing in GBP and Basis Point through time 
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Dependent Variable Month-to-month changes on basis points mispricing 
Independent Variables Coefficient t-Statistic P-value 
C 0,777 0,17 0,87 
FTSE -1,986 -3,194 0,002 
HF -5,406 -2,88 0,005 
VIX -5,759 -0,467 0,64 
Supply_nominal -0,0008 -1,438 0,155 
Supply_IL 0,003 2,308 0,024 
R
2 0,42   
F-stat (prob) 0   
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Table 5 – Regression output: Regression of month-to-month changes on mispricing (BP) on FTSE returns, 
Hedge Funds investing capacity (asset balances), VIX, and supply of Nominal gilts and IL gilts 
 
Figure 6 – Changes on mispricing against VIX level: Below the green dotted line markets are not very 
volatile while above the red dotted line, markets face high turbulence 
 
Figure 5 – Changes on mispricing (BP) against returns of the market (FTSE100) 
 
